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Adam Pautz 
What is the Integrated 
Information Theory 
of Consciousness? 
A Catalogue of Questions 
Abstract: In this paper, my goal is modest. I will not argue that the 
integrated information theory (IIT) is false. Instead, I will raise a 
number of basic questions about what the theory is. As long as propo-
nents of IIT do not address these questions, they have not put a clear 
theory on the table that can be evaluated as true or false. 
Integrated information theory (IIT) holds that the ‘level’ or ‘amount’ 
of consciousness in a system is determined by the amount of 
‘integrated information’ (Φ) in the system. Roughly, this is ‘the 
amount of information generated by a complex of elements, above and 
beyond the information generated by its parts’ (Tononi, 2008, p. 216). 
The theory promises to provide the holy grail: a mathematically pre-
cise and elegant theory linking conscious experiences to underlying 
physical states. 
The theory itself is neutral on the mind–body problem. In particular, 
it is neutral between ‘emergentism’ and ‘reductionism’ about con-
sciousness. Emergentists could take the principles of IIT to be funda-
mental psychophysical laws linking physical states of integrated 
information with the emergence of distinct states of consciousness. 
Reductionists could take them to be underwritten by psychophysical 
identities between states of consciousness and physical states of 
integrated information. IIT provides something that both reductionists 
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  WHAT  IS  IIT? 189 
and emergentists need: a simple and elegant theory linking conscious-
ness to the physical world.1 
Many find IIT attractive. In fact, Christof Koch has recently 
declared that ‘it’s the only really promising fundamental theory of 
consciousness’ (quoted in Zimmer, 2010). But it also faces problems. 
In his discussion, ‘Why I Am Not an Integrated Information Theorist’, 
Scott Aaronson has argued that it implies that consciousness is present 
in some very simple physical systems, because simple physical 
systems may have arbitrarily high levels of integrated information (Φ). 
For instance, he describes a simple ‘Vandermonde contraption’ and 
argues that IIT ‘predicts that this Vandermonde contraption would be 
billions of times more conscious than you are’ and indeed that such 
contraptions ‘can be unboundedly more conscious than humans are’ 
(Aaronson, 2014, my italics). Critics like Aaronson have regarded 
these consequences as amounting to a reductio ad absurdum. By con-
trast, proponents see them as interesting discoveries (Tononi, 2014; 
Tononi and Koch, 2015). 
In my view, such standard objections to IIT are not decisive. It is 
true that IIT has strange predictions. But if a theory of consciousness 
fits the data from humans and is more elegant than the alternatives, 
maybe we should accept the theory even if it has some strange pre-
dictions regarding the consciousness of non-humans. After all, some 
of our best physical theories have strange predictions too. The prob-
lem of consciousness is hard. We should keep an open mind. 
My primary aim is a modest one. I am not after a refutation of IIT. 
Instead, my main aim is just to raise a series of interpretive questions. 
I invite enthusiasts of IIT to say more about what they want to explain 
and how their approach is meant to explain it. 
                                                          
1  By reductionism, I mean the view that states of consciousness are identical with com-
plex physical or functional states. By emergentism, I mean the view that there are no 
such identities and that states of consciousness are dependent on physical or functional 
states by way of special ‘nomological laws’ or ‘grounding laws’. As Fodor put it, 
‘maybe the hard problem shows that not all basic laws are laws of physics… some of 
them are laws of emergence’ (2007). Examples of emergentism include dualism 
(Chalmers, 1995) and emergent physicalism (Rosen, 2010). Tononi appears to favour a 
reductive form of integrated information theory (Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi, 2014, 
p. 3). Koch, a recent convert to integrated information theory, is harder to classify. He 
says he is a ‘romantic reductionist’. Yet he also says that he is dualist who thinks that 
consciousness ‘is something fundamentally different from the material thing causing it 
and that it can never be fully reduced to the physical properties of the brain’ (2012, p. 
119). 
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 190 A.  PAUTZ 
In particular, I will address two issues. In the first instance, IIT is 
formulated as a theory of the physical basis of the ‘level’ or ‘amount’ 
of consciousness in a system. In addition, integrated information 
theorists have tried to provide a systematic theory of how physical 
states determine the specific qualitative contents of episodes of con-
sciousness: for instance, an experience as of a red and round thing 
rather than a green and square thing. First, I will raise a series of 
questions about the central explanatory target, the ‘level’ or ‘amount’ 
of consciousness (§1). Second, I will raise some questions about the 
explanation of qualitative content (§2). 
1. What Do Integrated Information Theorists 
Mean by ‘Level of Consciousness’? 
Typically, one thing theories of the physical basis of consciousness 
attempt to provide is an answer to the following question: 
 The Ignition Question: When is a physical system conscious? 
What is the correct, modally robust principle that tells us whether 
or not a system is conscious, given its physical state? 
Different theories provide different principles: for instance, functional 
theories typically appeal to a condition involving accessibility for 
global control (in reasoning, action, etc.), whereas biological theories 
require the presence of a specific type of neural state.2 
                                                          
2  For biological theories of consciousness, see Lamme (2006; 2010) and Block (2019). 
For accessibility theories, see Baars (1988), Dehaene (2014), and Tye (2000). 
Emergentists about consciousness could accept or co-opt these theories but take them to 
be non-reductive. For instance, Chalmers (forthcoming) suggests that dualists may posit 
a contingent psychophysical law connecting consciousness with ‘cognitive accessi-
bility’ somehow spelled out in physical terms. (A difficulty for this combination of 
views is that, since it is indeterminate at what moment in evolutionary history the states 
of organism first satisfied the very vague ‘cognitive accessibility’ condition (Tye, 2000, 
chapter 8), it implies that it is metaphysically indeterminate exactly when novel, 
emergent conscious states first appeared in the world. It is hard to make sense of such 
metaphysical indeterminacy.) Tononi and Koch (2015, p. 2) consider very crude 
accessibility theories based on actual verbal report and raise counter-examples 
involving dreams and animals; but these are not problems for sophisticated accessibility 
theories since the states of such individuals are poised to influence beliefs and guide 
behaviour even if they do not cause verbal reports. In fact, there can be no decisive 
counter-examples to such theories because where there is absolutely no accessibility 
whatever, as for instance in Block’s G.K. example (2007, p. 498), we can have at best 
very indirect and weak reason to think that there is consciousness (Chalmers, 1998/ 
2010, p. 99, fn. 2). 
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  WHAT  IS  IIT? 191 
IIT departs from standard theories in that it is primarily a theory of 
the ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness in a system, not just a theory 
of when consciousness is present or absent. Here are some representa-
tive statements: 
The IIT claims that consciousness is not an all-or-none property, but is 
graded. (Tononi, 2008, p. 236) 
The quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated 
information [Φ] generated by a complex of elements. (ibid., p. 216) 
IIT postulates that the amount of integrated information [Φ] that an 
entity possesses corresponds to its level of consciousness. (Koch, 2009) 
The quantity or level of consciousness [in a system] is measured by its 
[Φ] value. (Tononi and Koch, 2015, p. 9) 
Thus, IIT is framed with the observational term ‘the level or amount 
of consciousness’ and the theoretical term ‘Φ’. (Compare ‘level of 
heat is determined by mean molecular kinetic energy’.) Therefore, to 
understand what is being claimed, we must understand both of these 
terms. 
Here I will simply assume that Φ is a clear measure. Roughly, it is 
‘the amount of information generated by a complex of elements, 
above and beyond the information generated by its parts’ (Tononi, 
2008, p. 216). There are multiple ways of defining ‘Φ’. In a recent 
development of the theory (integrated information theory 3.0), 
Oizumi, Albantakis and Tononi (2014) supply the currently favoured 
measure. For systems as complex as the human brain, it may be 
impossible in practice to get accurate estimates of the level of Φ.3 
Still, I will assume for the sake of discussion that Φ is a precise 
measure. 
Instead, I will develop a basic question about the key observational 
term, ‘the level or amount of consciousness’. To take a hypothetical 
example: suppose that we have determined that the Φ-value of a 
person’s brain has decreased due to intoxication (say, it has halved). 
Then IIT predicts that her ‘level or amount of consciousness’ has 
                                                          
3  For this reason, there is a real question of whether IIT is empirically testable. Casali et 
al. (2013) have found that another, more tractable index, PCI (Perturbational Com-
plexity Index), correlates with consciousness. And they suggest that PCI in turn correl-
ates with level of integrated information Φ. But Sitt et al. (2013, p. 552) object that ‘the 
PCI is not directly related to Tononi’s [Φ] measure proposed by IIT as a marker of 
consciousness’. So it is possible to question whether there is at present any reason at all 
to believe IIT and its radical implication that simple 2D gates are conscious. 
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 192 A.  PAUTZ 
decreased (it has halved). If IIT is to be a meaningful and testable 
theory, we must have an independent grasp on what this kind of pre-
diction means, and we must be able to confirm it by observation. 
However, it is not at all immediately clear what ‘level of conscious-
ness’ means. While we might all easily know what ‘consciousness’ 
means, ‘level of consciousness’ stands in need of clarification. For our 
conscious experiences are graded along multiple dimensions. Which 
one do integrated information theorists have in mind?4 
Let me begin by listing some of the dimensions along which con-
scious experiences are graded. Then I will be able to formulate my 
question more exactly. 
A preliminary: I will make the standard assumption that episodes of 
consciousness are essentially intentional. They have built-in inten-
tional contents, which I will call qualitative contents. These contents 
can be specified by a proposition. Since the content of a typical 
experience is very rich, we cannot fully specify the content of an 
experience in language. At best, we can give an approximation. For 
instance, the built-in qualitative content of an experience might be 
something like: there is a thing with a specific shade of red and a 
somewhat bulgy, tomato-shape directly in front of me. In an hallucina-
tion case, the content does not correspond to reality: there is no 
reddish or round thing in the world or in the brain.5 
Here now is a partial list of some of the dimensions along which 
experiences are graded: 
                                                          
4  See Pautz (2015) for the point that conscious states vary along multiple dimensions, so 
that talk of ‘the level or amount of consciousness’ is very unclear. Bayne, Hohwy and 
Owen (2016) develop the same basic point. Here I am drawing out a corollary of this 
point: IIT, because it is a theory of ‘the level or amount of consciousness’ in a system, is 
likewise fundamentally unclear. 
5  For discussions of the intentionality of experience, see for instance Tye (2000) and 
Chalmers (2006). By the ‘intentionality of experience’ I just mean that having a tomato-
like experience, for instance, essentially involves the seeming-presence of a round 
thing; it is essentially an experience as of a round thing. This is a pre-theoretical claim 
framed in ordinary language. It seems to be an obviously correct description of the 
phenomenology of experience. It follows that a full characterization of the essence of 
the experience must mention the feature round that enters into the content of the experi-
ence. Some have denied this. For instance, Papineau (2016) has recently defended the 
view that to have the tomato-like experience is to undergo an internal neural state whose 
essential nature be can fully described in terms of types of neurons and the times, 
directions, and intensities at which they fire, without using the spatial term round at all. 
But this goes against the phenomenology. 
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  WHAT  IS  IIT? 193 
 Intensity Level. Conscious experiences differ in the intensity of 
their qualitative contents. For instance, consider an experience of 
a noise at the threshold of hearing versus the experience of a rock 
concert, or the experience of a dull colour versus the experience 
of a bright colour. 
 Complexity Level. Individual conscious experiences differ in the 
complexity of their contents. For instance, an olfactory experi-
ence of a minty smell has a relatively simple content, along the 
lines of something minty hereabouts. By contrast, a visual experi-
ence of a street scene in Paris has a very complex or ‘rich’ con-
tent involving the attribution of numerous properties (shapes, 
colours) to many objects and regions. Indeed, some think that the 
content involves the attribution of high-level properties like being 
a happy face, being a car, and so on. Maybe the contents of the 
experiences of primitive creatures like snails are much simpler 
than the contents of our experiences. 
 Determinacy Level. Conscious experiences differ in the deter-
minacy of their content. If you look at a tomato right in front of 
you, the content of your experience specifies a more-or-less 
determinate colour, and a more-or-less determinate shape. If you 
move the tomato to the periphery of your visual field, then the 
spatial content becomes more ‘degraded’, less determinate and 
more ‘determinable’, because of the lower spatial resolution of 
peripheral vision. Likewise, stimuli presented in low-contrast 
conditions might be experienced with little precision. It is natural 
to think that the contents of experiences in dreams and imagery 
are indeterminate and degraded. And maybe this is something 
that happens if a person becomes highly sedated. Determinacy 
Level is not the same as Complexity Level: if you look at a blank 
wall in front of you, the content of your experience has a low 
complexity level but it has a high determinacy level: it specifies a 
more-or-less determinate colour. 
 Access Level. So far, we have seen that the contents of our 
experiences vary along a few dimensions. There may also be 
variation in our cognitive and functional access to the qualitative 
contents of our experiences. For instance, maybe there is varia-
tion in cognitive-uptake: ‘how much’ of the qualitative informa-
tion represented by experience is actually taken up into working 
memory for the control of action. On some views, the access 
level of an experience could in principle be zero. For instance, 
Ned Block speculates that the patient G.K. might have an isolated 
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 194 A.  PAUTZ 
experience with a determinate content specifying the presence of 
a face, but where this content is not and indeed cannot be cog-
nitively accessed at all (2007, p. 498). At the other extreme, if 
you have an experience with a very simple qualitative content, 
and fully attend to that content, you may be able to completely 
cognitively ‘take in’ precisely that content (say, believe it) while 
you are having the experience. This would be the upper bound of 
access level. 
 Richness of Experiential Repertoire. So far, we have seen that 
specific experiences can be roughly ordered along various dimen-
sions. We can also order creatures along a dimension that we 
might call ‘experiential repertoire’. This I intend to be a capacity 
notion. Roughly, by the ‘experiential repertoire’ of a creature I 
mean the ‘number’ of distinct experiences (types and tokens) the 
creature has the capacity to have. For instance, an ordinary adult 
human has colour experiences, auditory experiences, and so on. 
She can have endless distinct visual experiences presenting 
different combinations of colours and shapes. This defines her 
experiential repertoire. If she suddenly became blind, then there 
would be a reduction in her experiential repertoire. Newborns 
have a less rich experiential repertoire than adults. Maybe snails 
have a still smaller experiential repertoire. In that sense, snails 
have a ‘lower level of creature-consciousness’ than humans. 
Having distinguished these dimensions along which conscious states 
are graded, I can reformulate my question in this way: 
 Q1: By ‘level of consciousness’, do integrated information 
theorists mean to refer to one of the dimensions just described? 
Or do they mean to refer to some other dimension not yet 
specified? Exactly what aspect of consciousness is it that, on their 
theory, is supposed to wax and wane precisely in proportion to 
Φ? 
As long as integrated information theorists do not address the 
question, we literally do not know what they are claiming and their 
theory is untestable. It is as if they are saying ‘the bling-value of a 
system’s consciousness is measured by the Φ-value of that system’, 
without giving any indication of what they mean by ‘bling-value’. 
I also have some more specific questions. For any dimension or 
scale, we can ask some basic questions. To begin with, we can ask 
whether it forms a ratio scale or a mere ordinal scale (Gescheider, 
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1997). And we can ask if it has an upper bound or it is unbounded. So 
the following questions arise: 
 Q2: Does whatever dimension that integrated information 
theorists are referring to by ‘level of consciousness’ have ratio 
scale? 
 Q3: Does the dimension they have in mind have an upper bound 
or is it unbounded? 
How might integrated information theorists answer Q1–Q3? 
Let me start with Q2 and Q3. Integrated information theorists do not 
explicitly address these basic questions. But I think it is clear that, 
whatever they mean by ‘level of consciousness’, their theory straight-
forwardly implies that it has a ratio scale and is unbounded. This 
follows from two things: (i) IIT holds that ‘level of consciousness’ is 
measured by Φ, and (ii) Φ has a ratio scale and is unbounded. In his 
commentary, Aaronson (2014) implicitly agrees that IIT has these 
implications. He writes that the theory ‘predicts that [a] Vandermonde 
contraption would be billions of times more conscious than you are’. 
This assumes a ratio scale. He also writes that IIT implies that such 
contraptions ‘can be unboundedly more conscious than humans are’ 
(my italics) because they can have unboundedly high levels of Φ. 
And, in his 2014 response, Tononi doesn’t dispute these claims. 
Now let me turn back to my main question, Q1. What specific 
dimension do integrated information theorists have in mind by the 
expression ‘level of consciousness’ when they propose in their theory 
that ‘level of consciousness is exactly measured by Φ’? Let us go 
through the candidates listed above one by one. 
To begin with, it is quite clear that integrated information theorists 
do not have in mind either Intensity Level or Complexity Level when 
they speak of ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness. For instance, 
Tononi (2014) says that if you stare at blank wall then you can be 
‘highly conscious’. But the qualitative content of this experience is 
neither intense nor complex. 
But then what do integrated information theorists have in mind by 
‘level’ or ‘amount’ of consciousness? One clue is provided by the 
following passage from Tononi and Koch’s paper ‘Consciousness: 
Here, There and Everywhere?’: 
P1: Consciousness is graded… In us [consciousness] becomes richer as 
we grow from a baby to an adult whose brain has fully matured and 
becomes more functionally specialized. It can also wax and wane when 
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we are highly alert or drowsy, intoxicated by drugs or alcohol, or 
become demented in old age. (Tononi and Koch, 2015, p. 11) 
They then speculate that the waxing and waning of ‘level of con-
sciousness’ correlates with the waxing and waning of Φ. So here is 
one thing we know about ‘level of consciousness’ as it is understood 
by Tononi and Koch: it varies with age, level of alertness, and level of 
intoxication. 
This is consistent with their having in mind either Determinacy 
Level or Access Level. For it is plausible that these also wax and wane 
with level of alertness, intoxication, and so on. For instance, when we 
become very intoxicated or sedated, the contents of our experiences 
may become less determinate. In addition, less information from the 
content of experience is cognitively processed for use by ‘consuming 
systems’. That is, it is not implausible that both Determinacy Level 
and Access Level go down. Maybe, then, we should interpret their 
theory as claiming that one of these is determined by Φ? 
The trouble is that if Tononi and Koch mean either one of these 
things then IIT would have false implications. As noted above, IIT 
implies that ‘level of consciousness’, whatever it is, is unbounded, 
because Φ is unbounded. Indeed, Aaronson shows that a large network 
of XOR gates arranged in a simple expander graph can have 
arbitrarily high levels of Φ. By contrast, in any possible creature, both 
Determinacy Level and Access Level have an upper bound. In 
principle, there is always a maximum for Determinacy Level: it occurs 
when a creature has an experience as of a property and there are no 
more specific, perceptually available ways of having that property. 
For instance, if you look at a white wall, maybe the qualitative content 
of your experience could involve a maximally-specific shade of 
colour. Also, there is always a maximum for Access Level: for 
instance, if you are fully awake and attentive, you might fully cog-
nitively ‘take in’ the complete content of experience while you are 
having the experience. No higher level of access is possible. So if the 
IIT ‘level of consciousness is determined by Φ’ is interpreted to be 
about either of Determinacy Level or Access Level, its implication 
about unboundedness is false. 
A further point adds to the case against interpreting ‘level of con-
sciousness’ as Access Level. Recall that IIT implies that an expander 
graph might have an extremely high ‘levels of consciousness’ (what-
ever that means), because it has a high level of Φ. Indeed, its level of 
consciousness could be unboundedly higher than your own as you 
look at a white wall. If we take this prediction to mean that its 
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cognitive access to the contents of its experiences is greater than your 
own, then the prediction is straightforwardly false. For the 2D grid 
doesn’t have a cognitive system at all! Apparently, for integrated 
information theorists, ‘level of consciousness’ picks out some dimen-
sion having to do with ‘phenomenal consciousness’, where the theory 
implies that this is totally separable from ‘cognitive access’. 
In sum, when integrated information theorists declare that ‘level of 
consciousness’ is determined by Φ, charity of interpretation demands 
that we not take them to be referring either to Determinacy Level or to 
Access Level. But then what are they referring to? 
There is only one remaining candidate on our list: Richness of 
Experiential Repertoire. Perhaps, when integrated information 
theorists say that ‘level of consciousness is determined by Φ’, they 
should be taken to be asserting something along the following lines: 
the number of distinct experiences a system can have is determined by 
its level of Φ. Call this the Repertoire interpretation. 
The Repertoire interpretation fits better than the previous interpreta-
tions with the implications of IIT. In particular, we saw that IIT 
implies that ‘level of consciousness’ is unbounded. It is not unnatural 
to think that ‘Richness of Experiential Repertoire’ is unbounded: there 
is no upper bound to the number and variety of distinct experiences a 
system could enjoy. 
In addition, some remarks by Tononi in his paper ‘Consciousness as 
Integrated Information: A Provisional Manifesto’ suggest something 
in the vicinity of the Repertoire interpretation. Here are the relevant 
passages: 
P2: You are facing a blank screen that is alternately on and off, and you 
have been instructed to say ‘light’ when the screen turns on and ‘dark’ 
when it turns off… For you, a light screen is different not only from a 
dark screen, but from a multitude of other images, so when you say 
‘light’, it really means this specific way versus countless other ways, 
such as a red screen, a green screen, a blue screen, this movie frame, 
that movie frame, and so on for every movie frame (not to mention for a 
sound, smell, thought, or any combination of the above)… All this 
added meaning, provided implicitly by how we discriminate pure light 
from all these alternatives… increases the level of consciousness. 
(Tononi, 2008, pp. 217–18, my italics) 
P3: By subtraction, [you] can realize that, if [you] were to lose one 
neural mechanism after the other, [your] being conscious of ‘light’ 
would degrade — it would lose its non-coloredness, its non-shapedness, 
it would even lose its visualness… (ibid., p. 218, my italics) 
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P4: The IIT claims that consciousness is not an all-or-none property, 
but is graded: specifically, it increases in proportion to a system’s 
repertoire of discriminable states. (ibid., p. 236) 
However, other considerations strongly count against the Repertoire 
interpretation. 
(i) The passages P2 and P3 are extremely hard to understand. But 
the most natural interpretation is this: when you experience a white 
screen, your ‘level of consciousness’ at that time is determined by the 
number of distinct, alternative experiences you could have at that 
time, given your neural machinery. 
But this is an exceedingly odd notion of ‘level of consciousness’. 
For here is a natural assumption: your experience of the white screen 
could stay the same, while there is variation in the number of alter-
native experiences you could have. For instance, while having the very 
same experience of the white screen, you could (unknown to you) 
suddenly totally lose the capacity to have any sensations of smell. 
After all, people do entirely lose their sense of smell (due to an 
infection, injury, or stroke) but retain the capacity to have exactly the 
same visual experiences that they had before. Then the suggested 
notion of ‘level of consciousness’ undeniably implies that your ‘level 
of consciousness’, while experiencing the white screen, would go 
down, even though the phenomenal character of your total experience 
has remained exactly the same, because of a reduction in the number 
of alternative experiences you can have. That is, your ‘level of 
consciousness’ at a time is independent of the phenomenal character 
of your total conscious state at that time. And this is a very odd 
conception of ‘level of consciousness’. 
(ii) Although passages P2–P4 from Tononi’s earlier 2008 essay 
suggest the Repertoire interpretation, other passages in Tononi and 
Koch’s more recent 2015 essay mentioned above seem to rule it out. 
For instance, consider passage P1 above from that essay. In this 
passage Tononi and Koch say that drowsy, intoxicated, and demented 
people have a ‘lower level of consciousness’ than the rest of us. (They 
speculate that this is because they have lower levels of Φ, in accord-
ance with IIT.) But a drowsy person could presumably experience all 
the colours, smells, and so on that the rest of us can experience. After 
all, her sensory systems work just fine. True, she may not cognitively 
respond to them as much as us; but just because there is a reduction in 
cognitive access does not mean there is a reduction in phenomenal 
consciousness. (Likewise, in at least some cases of intoxication or 
dementia, there is no reduction in the number of basic sensations the 
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person can have.) Since Tononi and Koch say in this passage that a 
drowsy person has a ‘lower level of consciousness’ than a fully awake 
person, but since she doesn’t have a lower repertoire of possible 
experiences, this passage suggests that they do not have the repertoire 
interpretation of ‘level of consciousness’ in mind. But then we are left 
wondering what they mean. 
In addition, in the same 2015 essay, Tononi and Koch say that ‘an 
experience of pure darkness and silence is what it is because… it 
necessarily differs from a large number of alternative experiences I 
could have’ (p. 6). This is similar to what Tononi said in the passages 
above from his 2008 essay. But, in their 2015 paper, they do not call 
this ‘level of consciousness’; in this essay, they call it ‘information’. 
They do use ‘level of consciousness’ elsewhere in the essay, but they 
do not explain what they mean. So, in this paper at least, they appear 
to use ‘level of consciousness’ to mean something other than 
repertoire of alternative experiences. But, again, we then are left 
wondering what they mean. 
Likewise, elsewhere Tononi (2012, p. 306) says: ‘the “richness” of 
an experience is the number of [experiential] dimensions’, while ‘the 
level of consciousness is the value of maximally integrated conceptual 
information’. This clearly shows that he takes ‘level of consciousness’ 
to refer to something other than the number of potential experiences. 
In sum, when integrated information theorists use ‘level of con-
sciousness’, it is not clear that they have in mind any one of the 
dimensions listed above. Perhaps, then, they mean some other dimen-
sion, not yet specified? But it is hard to see what this other dimension 
could be since the list above seems to exhaust the options. Or perhaps 
their use of the term is vague or indeterminate: they use the term but 
they simply don’t have in mind anything in particular. 
In any case, as long as integrated information theorists do not 
address the question, we literally do not know what they are claiming. 
It is as if they are saying ‘the bling-value of a system’s consciousness 
is measured by the Φ-value of that system’, without giving any 
indication of what they mean by ‘bling-value’. 
I am not saying that the theory ‘the amount or level of a system’s 
consciousness is determined by its Φ-value’ is false. My worry is that 
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no clear view has yet been put on the table that we can test as true or 
false.6 
2. How Might IIT Explain Qualitative Content? 
At the start of the previous section, I noted that one question for a 
theory of the physical basis of consciousness is the Ignition Question: 
when is a physical system conscious? This is the question that has 
received the most attention. For instance, global broadcast theories 
(Baars, 1988; Dehaene, 2014) address the Ignition Question only. But 
there is an additional question a complete theory must answer: 
                                                          
6  It may be worth mentioning yet another, somewhat unusual, interpretation of integrated 
information theorists’ talk of ‘the level of consciousness’. I will call it the inscrutable 
interpretation. Let me introduce it with an analogy. Suppose that you belong to a 
species that is like us except that the species has no vision whatever. However, suppose 
that by some miracle you occasionally have a ganzfeld experience of a certain specific 
shade of red. You never experience any other colours. Then you might not appreciate 
that there is a general dimension colour which encompasses many other colours. A 
neuroscientist might somehow infer that there is such a dimension, but you would have 
no direct grip on it. You would be ‘cognitively closed’ with respect to this dimension. 
On the inscrutable interpretation, we are in a similar position with respect to the relevant 
dimension of consciousness. That is to say, since integrated information theorists are 
wedded to their theory that consciousness is attached to Φ, and since different systems 
than us (e.g. 2D gates) have different levels of Φ, they infer that they must enjoy 
different ‘levels’ of consciousness than we do. But, according to the inscrutable inter-
pretation, because we are at all times ‘stuck’ with our own, single level of conscious-
ness, we have no direct grasp of this dimension and the other possible values along this 
dimension. So, ‘level of consciousness’, the variable magnitude allegedly measured by 
Φ, should not be taken to refer to one of the dimensions discussed above which we do 
grasp; instead, it refers to another, hitherto undiscovered, dimension that we do not 
directly grasp. Our only reason to believe in this ‘other dimension’ is based on the 
speculative integrated information theory itself. Could this be the correct interpretation 
of IIT as defended by Tononi and Koch? To begin with, it has an odd consequence: IIT 
is, in the first instance, a theory of something we don’t have a direct grasp on! For the 
idea is that, although we have a grasp on our own consciousness, we have no direct 
grasp on the relevant magnitude level of consciousness — just as in the example above, 
although we have a grasp on the relevant shade of red, we have no direct grasp on the 
general dimension colour. In any case, the inscrutable interpretation is directly contra-
dicted by what Tononi and Koch say. For, according to the inscrutable interpretation, 
we are at all times stuck with exactly the same level of consciousness — this is 
supposed to be why we have no direct grip on this dimension. As against this, in 
passage P1 above, Koch and Tononi say that our own level of consciousness waxes and 
wanes with our age, with our level of intoxication, and so on. (Indeed, this is crucial to 
the possibility of empirically confirming the theory in the first place, because in that 
case the theory would be confirmed if Φ waxes and wanes in the same way.) So, from 
such waxing and waning in our own case, we should have a direct grasp of at least some 
different levels of consciousness. What Tononi and Koch say here, then, is directly 
inconsistent with the inscrutable interpretation. 
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 The Quality Question: What specific conscious experiences does 
a physical system have? More exactly, what is the complete set of 
psychophysical principles which, together with the physical facts 
concerning any arbitrary physical system, entail the precise quali-
tative contents of all of its conscious experiences? 
To illustrate, suppose that you are a super-scientist, you know all the 
physical facts about some unfamiliar sentient organism, Karl. If you 
also somehow knew the complete set of psychophysical principles, 
you could deduce the qualitative contents of all of Karl’s experiences. 
For reductionists about consciousness, such principles will be 
underwritten by identities between states of consciousness and com-
plex physical states (e.g. neural states). For those who consider con-
sciousness to be an emergent phenomenon, the principles will be basic 
‘laws’ relating physical states (e.g. neural states) with distinct, emer-
gent states of consciousness. The holy grail would be psychophysical 
laws with the simplicity and elegance of the basic laws of physics. 
Many philosophers (e.g. Dretske, 1995; Tye, 2000) favour an 
externalist answer to the Quality Question. This view has two parts. 
First, there is a raft of basic identities between ‘qualia’ and physical 
properties in the world: for instance, shape qualia are just physical 
shapes, colour qualia are certain reflectance-types, smell qualia are 
chemical types, and so on. Second, we experience them by having 
neural states that have the biological function of indicating their 
occurrence. 
In my view, however, such a view faces huge empirical and a priori 
problems. I believe that standard neuroscience provides strong 
empirical support for an internalist answer to the Quality Question.7 In 
particular, the qualitative contents of experience are completely deter-
mined by our internal neural states. Let me provide some examples. 
                                                          
7  For some a priori problems with Dretske-Tye externalism, see Pautz (2017). For the 
empirical problems, see Pautz (2014). The basic problem is that there is no systematic 
isomorphism or mapping between qualia and external physical properties (e.g. very 
similar chemical types often give us experiences of very different smell qualia). By 
contrast, as I am about to point out, there is a better correlation between qualitative 
content and neural patterns. Papineau (2003) expresses scepticism about whether the 
debate between externalism and internalism about qualitative content can be settled 
empirically. (Papineau, 2016, instead offers a non-empirical, philosophical argument 
against Dretske-Tye externalism and for an internalist view.) As against Papineau’s 
scepticism, such empirical findings clearly support internalism over externalism. 
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Afterwards we will look at integrated information theorists’ very 
different answer to the Quality Question. 
Pain intensity. Using noxious temperatures and measuring neural 
activity with fMRI, Coghill et al. (1999, p. 1936) found that ‘many 
cortical areas exhibit significant, graded changes in activation linearly 
related to pain intensity’. Kenshalo et al. (2000) found in a single-unit 
study that the relationship between temperature and the firing rates of 
wide dynamic range (WDR) neurons in monkey S1 very closely 
resembles the psychophysically-derived relationship between 
temperature and pain intensity in humans. And Timmerman et al. 
(2001) found using magnetoencephalography that S1 neural activity 
perfectly matched subjects’ pain ratings in response to nociceptive 
laser stimuli delivered to the hand (see Figure 1a). 
Smell and taste. Howard and co-workers (2009) found that ‘spatially 
distributed ensemble activity in human posterior piriform cortex 
(PPC) coincides with perceptual ratings of odor quality, such that 
odorants with more (or less) similar fMRI patterns were perceived as 
more (or less) alike’. For instance, they found that your PPC neural 
representation of R-limonene resembles your PPC neural representa-
tion of citral more than your PPC neural representation of R-carvone, 
in perfect agreement with the character of your smell experiences. 
Similar results have been found for the experience of taste (Crouzet, 
Busch and Ohla, 2015). 
Audition. Relkin and Doucet (1997, p. 2738) write that ‘the per-
ceived loudness of a pure tone appears to be linked both to the number 
of spikes fired by single neurons and to spatial spread of excitation in 
the auditory nerve’. Langers et al. (2007) used fMRI to look at neural 
activity further downstream in the auditory cortex. They found that 
‘cortical activity is more closely related to the perceptual loudness 
level of sound than to its [external, physical] intensity level’ (p. 714) 
and indeed report ‘a type of non-linearity… comparable to that 
reported in psychophysical studies on loudness perception that employ 
subjective loudness scaling’ (ibid., p. 716). On the basis of this study 
and others, Röhl, Kollmeier and Uppenkamp (2011, p. 1494) conclude 
that ‘the most simple interpretation would be that AC [auditory 
cortex] is fed by… the auditory brainstem according to the sound 
pressure level and the bandwidth of the stimuli, and an additional 
component is added which is linearly related to the perceived 
loudness’. 
Colour. In a recent study, Bohon et al. (2016) recorded the activity 
of neurons in V4 (see also Brouwer and Heeger, 2009). They then 
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used multidimensional scaling to analyse their colour-tuning. Here is 
how they summarize their results: 
The arrangement of the [neural responses] clearly reflects color space: 
points of the same hue irrespective of luminance level are plotted next 
to each other, and the progression of the points forms a circle that 
proceeds according the color wheel. Behavioral judgments of the 
similarity between colors closely match the similarities between the 
neural responses to these colors by the glob neural population. (p. 18) 
See Figure 1b for an illustration. There is also the fact that we experi-
ence unitary colours (red, green, yellow, blue) and binary colours 
(orange, purple, etc.). The textbook explanation is that we have an r-g 
channel and a y-b channel. The experience of unitary colours corres-
ponds to equilibria states of the channel and the experience of binary 
colours correspond to a departure from equilibria in both channels. 
This explanation is controversial (Webster, 2018), but it does continue 
to have adherents (Schmidt, Neitz and Neitz, 2014; Danilova and 
Mollon, 2012). 
  
Figure 1. A. Multidimensional scaling and representational similarity 
analyses showed that neural pattern in both glob and interglob populations 
were correlated with the organization of CIELUV space, but glob cells 
showed a stronger correlation. From Bohon et al. (2016, Creative 
Commons). B. Amplitudes of SI activity (black line, left scale) match pre-
cisely the subjects’ pain ratings (grey line, right scale). Reprinted from 
Timmerman et al. (2001) with permission. 
Now these studies fall short of providing a complete set of psycho-
physical principles. But they do offer some rough principles. For 
instance, the intensity of qualitative content is determined by firing 
rates. The similarity of experiences is determined by similarity of 
distributed neural patterns, as measured by multidimensional scaling. 
Whether you experience a unitary or binary colour is perhaps deter-
mined by relative activity across the r-g and y-b opponent channels. 
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The hope is that there is a complete set of precise psychophysical 
principles in the vicinity. Maybe, for instance, there is one psycho-
physical principle for colour, another for smell, yet another for pain 
intensity, and so on. There might be a number of systematic mappings 
from neural parameters onto qualitative parameters. Each of them 
might have something like the following form: 
 [L] If a system has neural state P, then the system has an experi-
ence with qualitative content f(P). 
Here f is a systematic function or mapping from specific neural states 
onto specific qualitative contents. As Stanislas Dehaene writes, ‘the 
[neural] code contains a full record of the subject’s experience’ and ‘if 
we could read this code we should gain full access to a person’s inner 
world’ (2014, pp. 143–5). Let us call this the standard neuroscience 
answer to the Quality Question.8 
The answer to the Quality Question offered by integrated informa-
tion theorists is quite different. While standard internalism holds that 
qualitative content is systematically determined by distributed, spatio-
temporal patterns of neuronal firing, integrated information theorists 
hold that it is determined by something that I will call ‘T-shape’ (for 
Tononi shape), leaving it neutral whether T-shape is the basis of quali-
tative content. This is a novel notion that has not figured in standard 
neuroscience. Very roughly, a distributed pattern of neural activity can 
help determine a ‘T-shape’. This is a literal shape in a multi-
dimensional ‘cause–effect space’. The T-shape is not fixed by the 
distributed pattern of neural activity alone. Instead, it is determined 
holistically: 
Rather than trying to understand the meaning of the activity of some 
elements (neurons) in isolation, or even of distributed patterns of 
activity, the IIT claims that meaning is only generated in terms of 
shapes in Q, that is, in terms of the set of informational relationships 
generated by a complex… Moreover, informational relationships, and 
thus the [Q-shape] are specified both by the elements that are firing and 
by those that are not. (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009, p. 12) 
                                                          
8  There are many neglected challenges to the idea that there are systematic psycho-
physical mapping principles entailing the qualitative contents of any creature given the 
physical facts about that creature. See Adams (1987, pp. 256–7), Chalmers (2012, pp. 
279, 341), MacLeod (2010), O’Regan (2011, p. 99), Prinz (2012, pp. 126–33), and 
Teller and Pugh (1984). Notwithstanding these challenges, standard neuroscience has 
made real progress when it comes to the Quality Question. 
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In other words, a T-shape ‘embodies the entire set of informational 
relationships generated by interactions in the system’ (ibid., p. 1). It 
follows that ‘it does not make sense to ask about the [T-shape] 
generated by a mechanism in isolation, or by a state (firing pattern) in 
isolation’. In fact, ‘two different systems having identical activity 
patterns may generate different [T-shapes]’, because of holistic differ-
ences in informational relationships (ibid.). 
For a system with n binary elements and 2n possible states, T-shape 
is a shape in a 2n dimensional space (ibid., p. 6). For a human brain, 
which has endlessly many possible states, T-shape will be a shape in a 
space with a mind-boggling number of dimensions. So integrated 
information theorists concede that ‘in practice it is not possible to 
determine [T-shape] precisely for a realistic system’ (ibid., p. 9). 
Nevertheless, integrated information theorists make a bold specula-
tion. They posit a psychophysical principle linking these hypothesized 
‘T-shapes’ (which are physical, albeit abstract, properties) with 
qualitative content: 
 Similarity-Congruence: If the total state of a system determines 
T-shapes that stand in a certain similarity-order (e.g. T1 is more 
than T2 than T3), then the system experiences qualitative contents 
that stand in the same similarity-order. 
For instance they write, ‘similarity between experiences reduces to [or 
is determined by] similarities between shapes’ (ibid., p. 23). They 
have not said much more than this on the issue of how the physical 
facts determine the specific qualitative contents of our experiences.9 
In sum, while integrated information theorists hold that Φ deter-
mines ‘level of consciousness’, they hold that ‘T-shape’ determines 
the specific qualitative content of experience. 
Previously, I just assumed that Φ is a well-defined physical 
quantity. Then I raised some basic questions about the further claim 
that it determines ‘level of consciousness’. Likewise, for the sake of 
                                                          
9  Here is another quotation: ‘Different experiences — every different scene in a movie or 
in a dream — correspond to different [T-]shapes, with some shapes being measurably 
closer (red and blue) and some more distant within the space (a black screen and a city 
scene)… Indeed, there is much scope for future research to begin mapping psycho-
physics, for example, the circular nature of colour space, onto the geometry of shapes in 
cause–effect space — except that a shape in cause–effect space, unlike the shape of an 
object in 3D space, is the shape within, the shape of experience itself… It is the voice in 
the head, the light inside the skull’ (Tononi and Koch, 2015, p. 11). 
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discussion, I will now assume that T-shapes are well-defined, abstract 
physical properties of a physical system. This leaves open the further 
issue of whether T-shapes determine the qualitative contents of 
experience. I have a number of basic questions about this idea. 
To begin with, recall that what is needed is a complete set of psycho-
physical principles: a set of principles which, together with the 
physical facts concerning any physical system, entail the precise quali-
tative contents of all of its conscious experiences. But proponents of 
IIT have only proposed a single psychophysical principle: Similarity-
Congruence. For several reasons, this falls well short of a complete set 
of psychophysical principles. And it is not clear how the single notion 
of ‘T-shape’ could be the basis of a complete psychophysical theory. 
Let us take these points in turn. 
To see how Similarity-Congruence falls short, let us return to the 
hypothetical case mentioned above: you are a super-scientist, you 
know all the physical facts about some unfamiliar sentient organism, 
Karl. You want to determine exactly what experiences Karl has. That 
is, you are engaged in the task of ‘radical phenomenal interpretation’. 
Suppose that Karl is presented with three objects consecutively and, 
given the physical facts about his brain, you deduce that it is 
associated with three T-shapes such that T1 is more like T2 than T3. 
Then, given Similarity-Congruence, you can deduce that Karl has 
some trio of experiences, E1, E2, and E3, such that E1 is more like E2 
than E3. But, as a simple point of logic, Similarity-Congruence is not 
logically strong enough to tell us precisely what those experiences are. 
For instance, it doesn’t tell us whether they are colour experiences of 
similar shades of red, or whether they are colour experiences of simi-
lar shades of green. In fact, it doesn’t tell us whether they are experi-
ences of colour or experiences of (say) smell. That is, it doesn’t entail 
the specific, determinate qualitative contents of those experiences. 
This is not to say that Similarity-Congruence is false; it is just to say 
that it is not the full story. 
Here is a second respect in which Similarity-Congruence falls short. 
Take colour experiences. The qualitative contents of colour experi-
ences vary along several dimensions: hue (red vs. green and yellow 
vs. blue), saturation, and brightness. So it is natural to expect that 
there are corresponding physical parameters determined by neural 
activity and that there are systematic psychophysical laws going from 
these parameters to the qualitative dimensions. As we saw above, the 
models of standard neuroscience roughly provide such laws (e.g. the 
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hypothesized r-g and y-b channels determine hue). But Similarity-
Congruence provides nothing of the sort. 
Finally, the qualitative contents of our experience do not just stand 
in similarity relationships; they also vary in intensity and indeed some 
exhibit a ratio scale. For instance, suppose again you are a super-
scientist observing Karl. Karl experiences two tones where the second 
tone is 10 dB more intense than the first one. For humans, a general 
rule of thumb is that a 10 dB increase in intensity causes a doubling in 
perceived loudness. Suppose that this holds for Karl as well. Then 
here is a phenomenal fact about his experiences: the loudness-level 
that Karl experiences roughly doubles.10 A complete set of psycho-
physical principles should entail this fact, given a complete physical 
description of Karl’s neural response to the 10 dB increase. But, as a 
simple point of logic, nothing like this can be derived from the 
physical facts about Karl and Similarity-Congruence alone. 
So here is my first question: 
 Q4: Since Similarity-Congruence falls short, how might psycho-
physical principles based on the notion of T-shape be formulated, 
in order to obtain a complete, systematic theory? Given a 
physical description of Karl, such principles would entail exactly 
what experiences he has (colour experiences, olfactory experi-
ences, etc.), their intensities, and so on. 
How might proponents of the T-shape theory answer this question? 
Balduzzi and Tononi make a speculation that may seem to help: 
According to the IIT, phenomenological differences [between the 
experience of colour, smell, and so on] correspond to different basic 
sub-shapes in Q, such as grid-like structures and pyramid-like 
structures. (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009, p. 20) 
In the IIT framework, colors correspond to different sub-shapes of the 
same kind (say pyramids pointing in different directions) and sounds to 
very different sub-shapes in Q. (ibid., p. 22) 
The idea seems to be this. We have seen that integrated information 
theorists speculate that the brain can be associated with T-shapes in a 
space with a mind-boggling number of dimensions. Now they are 
adding that the T-shapes fall into categories. To illustrate, they say 
                                                          
10  Here I am assuming that perceived loudness has a genuine ratio scale so that it makes 
sense to say that perceived loudness doubles with a 10 dB increase. One piece of 
evidence for this is that subjects’ estimations obey additivity (Gescheider, 1997, p. 265). 
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that different pyramids may be the physical basis of different colour 
experiences; T-shapes of a different kind may be the physical basis of 
auditory experiences; and so on. Of course, ‘pyramids’ is just a some-
what silly example used for illustrative purposes. The idea is that there 
are some different categories of high-dimensional T-shapes that under-
lie the different categories of experiences, but we do not know what 
they are. 
Of course, this is another piece of unbridled speculation. But 
assuming for the sake of discussion that it is true, we can ask how it 
could be the basis of a simple set of complete psychophysical 
principles. 
Maybe the idea is that the final complete psychophysical theory will 
replace Similarity-Congruence with a swarm of more specific 
principles invoking the different categories of T-shapes. But what are 
these more specific principles? 
One idea is that they are more specific principles of the same form 
as Similarity-Congruence: ‘similar pyramid shapes are the basis of the 
experience of similar phenomenal colours’ and ‘similar grid-shapes 
are the basis of the experience of similar smells’, and so on. But this 
proposal still falls short of completeness in the ways catalogued 
above. These principles are still too unspecific. For instance, if you 
were a super-scientist and knew that Karl’s brain state on two occa-
sions determined similar pyramid shapes, then from such principles 
you would only be able to deduce that he experiences some or other 
similar phenomenal colours on those occasions, but you would not be 
able to deduce exactly what these phenomenal colours are. 
To guarantee completeness, integrated information theorists might 
suggest a list of even more specific fundamental principles that cover 
all the possible cases: 
 Pyramid shape S1 is the physical basis of experiencing red1 
 Pyramid shape S2 is the physical basis of experiencing red2 
 … 
 Pyramid shape S101 is the physical basis of experiencing green1 
 … 
 Grid-like shape S1 is the physical basis of experiencing smell1 
 Grid-like shape S2 is the physical basis o experiencing smell2 
 Etc. 
This would indeed guarantee completeness. If you were a super-
scientist and you were armed with a list of such principles covering all 
possible cases then you could deduce the specific qualitive contents of 
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all of Karl’s experiences — or indeed the qualitative contents of any 
possible sentient being. 
But it is hard to believe that there is a different fundamental 
principle for each possible experience. For one thing, this view is 
complicated and unlovely. A much simpler psychophysical theory 
would posit a handful of general, systematic psychophysical princi-
ples, from which such more specific principles could be derived as 
special cases. Compare how Newton’s law of gravitation implies 
many specific mass–gravity connections as special cases. For another 
thing, there is the point already made above. The qualitative contents 
of our experiences vary along certain dimensions (hue, saturation, 
brightness, intensity, etc.). So it is natural to expect that there are 
corresponding physical parameters determined by neural activity and 
that there are systematic psychophysical laws going from these para-
meters to the qualitative dimensions. Thus, a list of associations 
between specific physical states and specific experience, such as the 
list above, cannot be the full story. There is reason to think that it is 
possible to specify more systematic mappings from physical states 
onto experiences. 
In sum, what proponents of the T-shape theory of qualitative content 
need is to at least sketch how a psychophysical theory based on T-
shape could be at once complete and systematic. Given the physical 
facts about Karl, such a complete set of systematic psychophysical 
principles would have to be powerful enough to entail, for instance, 
that the loudness-level that Karl experiences roughly doubles with a 
10 db increase. Standard neuroscience can sketch such principles. For 
instance, as noted above, Relkin and Doucet (1997, p. 2738) suggest 
that ‘the perceived loudness of a pure tone appears to be linked both to 
the number of spikes fired by single neurons and to spatial spread of 
excitation’. My question Q4 above is: can proponents of the T-shape 
theory sketch such principles? For instance, what is it about these 
high-dimensional T-shapes that could systematically determine the 
loudness of experienced sound?11 
                                                          
11  In discussion, Kelvin McQueen has suggested that perhaps integrated information 
theorists could say that the T-shapes underlying the experience of sounds have ‘extents’ 
and the ‘extent’ of the T-shape determines the perceived loudness of sound. Thus, if the 
‘extent’ doubles, the loudness of the perceived sound doubles. This would be an alterna-
tive to the standard neuroscience explanation in terms of firing rates and extent of 
excitation. But I am not sure what is meant by ‘the extent’ of a T-shape. In addition, 
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So much for Q4. My next question is this: 
 Q5: According to the T-shape theory, what is the physical basis 
of ‘binding’? 
For instance, suppose that Karl hallucinates a blue sphere above a 
green triangle. Presumably, on the T-shape theory, Karl’s brain deter-
mines four T-shapes, which are the physical bases of experiencing 
blue, experiencing green, experiencing roundness, and experiencing 
triangularity. But this does not explain why Karl experiences these 
features as bound together in the way that he does. Again, what is 
needed is a sketch of a complete set of systematic principles that 
entails all the experiential facts about Karl given the physical facts 
about him, including patterns of binding.12 
Here is my final question: 
 Q6: Is there any empirical evidence that supports the T-shape 
theory of qualitative content over standard neuroscience, which 
does not appeal T-shape? 
As far as I can tell, at present the answer to this question is no. At this 
stage, the idea that there could be a complete and systematic answer to 
the Quality Question based on the notion of T-shape is totally specula-
tive. As noted above, for a human brain, which has endlessly many 
possible states, T-shape will be a shape in a space with a mind-
boggling number of dimensions. So integrated information theorists 
concede that ‘in practice it is not possible to determine [T-shape] 
precisely for a realistic system’ (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009, p. 9). So 
it may be that the T-shape theory is untestable. True, Tononi and Koch 
rather hopefully say that ‘there is much scope for future research to 
begin mapping psychophysics, for example, the circular nature of 
colour space, onto the geometry of shapes in cause–effect space’ 
(2015, p. 11, my italics). But, at present, this remains totally untested. 
So, for instance, it is a prediction of the T-shape theory that, since the 
experience of blue is more like the experience of purple than the 
                                                                                                                  
unlike the standard neuroscience explanation, this explanation has not been supported 
empirically. 
12  Tononi et al. (2016, p. 457) do offer one remark on this issue: ‘According to IIT, this 
dynamic binding of phenomenal attributes occurs if, and only if, in cause–effect space 
the corresponding concept purviews are related, meaning that they refer to an over-
lapping set of PSC elements and jointly constrain their past or future states.’ This will 
perhaps be elaborated in future work. 
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experience of green, the corresponding T-shapes stand in an iso-
morphic resemblance-order. But there is no evidence to back this up. 
By contrast, as noted above, standard neuroscience has made real pro-
gress on the Quality Question, without invoking ‘T-shapes’ in an 
unspecified high-dimensional space.13 
It seems to me that one apparent empirical prediction of the T-shape 
theory is already known to be false. Balduzzi and Tononi (2009, p. 1) 
write that a T-shape ‘embodies the entire set of informational relation-
ships generated by interactions in the system’ (my italics). Accord-
ingly, Tsuchiya (2007, p. 7) writes that it is a prediction of the T-shape 
theory that ‘the quality of experience… can be determined only by the 
interactions with other neural interactions in a holistic manner’ so that 
the ‘visualness of visual experience is determined not only by the way 
visual neurons interact with other visual neurons, but it also depends 
on how the visual neurons interact with auditory neurons and other 
neurons within the complex’ (ibid., my italics). In other words, the T-
shape theory predicts that ‘vision cannot feel like vision unless it is 
related with other senses’ (ibid., Figure 2, p. 6). Now, is this pre-
diction correct? True, there are some cross-modal interactions. For 
instance, because of cross-modal binding, if you became totally deaf, 
the phenomenal character of some your visual experiences might be 
different. For instance, visually perceived dogs would no longer 
appear to make barking sounds. But the quotations suggest something 
much stronger: a radical form of experiential holism. For instance, 
taken literally, they imply that when a person entirely loses the 
capacity to experience smell (say, due to a stroke) then all of her 
visual experiences of the world change at least somewhat in their 
phenomenal character. Tononi (2008, pp. 217–18) says this explicitly 
regarding his ‘subtraction’ thought experiment. However, this pre-
diction is false. Of course, Balduzzi and Tononi (2009) and Tsuchiya 
(2007) may disavow my literal interpretation of their remarks. In that 
                                                          
13  Tsuchiya (2017, Section 4.1, p. 7) claims to have found empirical evidence for the T-
shape theory of qualitative content. But, at present, there is not sufficient empirical 
evidence to support the T-shape theory of qualitative content over the quite well-
confirmed explanations offered by standard neuroscience that were discussed above, 
which do not appeal to T-shape. As discussed above, multiple studies and decades of 
research support these explanations of the experience of pain intensity, loudness, smell 
and taste, and colour. 
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case, they need to clarify what they mean and state more clearly the 
empirical predictions of the T-shape theory.14 
3. Summary 
In the first place, IIT is a theory of the ‘level’ or ‘amount’ of con-
sciousness in a system. But it is totally unclear what this means 
because consciousness varies along many dimensions. As long as 
integrated information theorists do not address the question, we 
literally do not know they are claiming. It is as if they are saying ‘the 
bling-value of a system’s consciousness is measured by the Φ-value of 
that system’, without giving any indication of what is meant by ‘bling-
value’. Until they say more, no clear, testable theory has been put on 
the table. 
Integrated information theorists also offer a theory of the specific 
qualitative contents of experiences in terms of ‘T-shapes’. This theory 
faces several basic questions. It is hard to see how there could be a 
complete and systematic psychophysical theory based on the notion of 
T-shape. Moreover, the theory is at this point totally speculative and 
empirically untested. If anything, its prediction of radical holism is 
already known to be false. By contrast, standard neuroscience has 
made real progress on explaining the qualitative content of experience, 
without invoking ‘T-shapes’. 
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